With the objective of stabilizing global energy markets following the conflict in Iran, the Trump administration will temporarily waive maritime shipping compliance requirements under the Jones Act.

WHEN –

On March 12, 2026, the Trump administration publicly announced its intention to waive the Jones Act for 30 days in response to increased concerns about rising energy costs related mostly to crude oil prices, and broader national security interests such as supply chain disruptions and transportation of critical commodities.

On March 18, 2026, the White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt confirmed a 60-day Jones Act waiver intended to address short-term disruptions in the domestic energy market.

In a statement posted to X, Leavitt explained that “President Trump’s decision to issue a 60-day Jones Act waiver is just another step to mitigate the short-term disruptions to the oil market as the U.S. military continues meeting the objectives of Operation Epic Fury.”

She further stated that “[t]his action will allow vital resources like oil, natural gas, fertilizer, and coal to flow freely to U.S. ports for sixty days.”

WHAT –

Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, more commonly known as the Jones Act (the “Act”), regulates domestic shipping by requiring that all transport between United States ports be undertaken by vessels owned, built, and primarily crewed by U.S. citizens.[1] Under the Act, foreign vessels are permitted to move goods to and from the United States but may not engage in domestic, port-to-port transport. These restrictions aim to maintain a robust American merchant marine to support both the United States’ commercial interests and national security.[2]

Prioritizing domestic vessels over foreign vessels in cabotage[3] has roots as far back as 1789 when “the third law passed by the First Congress imposed duties on cargo with differing rates based on the provenance of a vessel.”[4] Further emphasizing the significance of the Jones Act, maritime unions and industry groups historically oppose any waiver of the Act and argue that such exemptions undermine American workers and domestic shipping.[5]

In an effort to preserve the Jones Act’s role of protecting the United States’ commercial interests and national security, Congress, through the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”), tightened the proverbial reins on waivers of the Jones Act.[6] Driven by concerns that exemptions would undermine domestic maritime capacity, Congress narrowed the waiver framework by requiring that any automatic waiver requested by the Secretary of Defense be “in the interest of the national defense to address an immediate adverse effect on military operations.” The 2023 NDAA further restricted the availability of discretionary waivers by mandating that only the President may determine whether such a waiver is necessary in the interest of national defense.

Today, as industry leaders pointed out in a March 12, 2026 letter, “Jones Act waivers are granted only in rare, exceptional circumstances, typically on national security grounds where U.S.-flag vessel capacity is unavailable.”[7] In addition to the practical difficulty of obtaining a waiver under 46 U.S.C. § 501, all waivers also face significant political ramifications because the United States shipping industry views these waivers as a direct threat to domestic maritime jobs and sovereignty.

WHY THE WAIVER WAS CONSIDERED –

The Administration’s consideration, and ultimate issuance, of a Jones Act waiver appears to be prompted by rising fuel costs. As of mid-March 2026, gasoline prices were averaging approximately $3.84 per gallon, reflecting an increase of $0.80 over a thirty-day period.

From its inception under the Roosevelt administration, the statutory and regulatory framework that governs Jones Act waivers sets a high standard with respect to the “national defense” justification. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) has historically taken the position that national defense waivers would not be issued for purely economic reasons such as commercial practicality or expediency.[8] The CBP’s consistent posture with respect to waiver justifications aligns with the policy objectives that have underpinned the Jones Act for over a century – the promotion of U.S. shipping interests.

Although Jones Act waivers are ostensibly reviewed on a case-by-case basis, the circumstances in which they have been granted or denied highlight the exacting standard that governs each request, notwithstanding the variation in the underlying circumstances.

For example, the Executive Branch has waived the Jones Act to expedite post-hurricane disaster relief on four separate occasions since 2005.[9]

Although requests arise in a variety of contexts, CBP has consistently determined that waivers are unwarranted where a sufficient national defense interest is not demonstrated. As one survey of administrative decisions reflects, such requests are denied in virtually every instance absent a qualifying national defense justification.[10]

The Colonial Pipeline Cyber Attack in 2021 – and the Administration’s response to Jones Act waiver requests – highlight the precision in which the Act is applied. In the aftermath of the ransomware attack and resulting fuel shortages, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) conducted an expedited review of multiple waiver requests for the transport of refined products. Despite the exigent circumstances, DHS denied seven of eight requests on the grounds that Jones Act-compliant vessels were available or that the proposed shipments would not timely alleviate the disruption, granting a waiver only for the cargo deemed “urgently needed.”

Similarly, in the wake of global energy disruptions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Administration declined to issue Jones Act waivers despite rising fuel prices and supply concerns. Requests to permit foreign-flag vessels to transport petroleum products between U.S. ports were rejected on the basis that domestic maritime capacity remained sufficient to meet demand.

Taken together, these examples demonstrate that the availability of a waiver does not hinge on the circumstances presented, but on whether granting such a waiver is necessary to satisfy a legitimate national defense interest without undermining the United States’ domestic maritime capability.

TRADE IMPLICATIONS –

While the temporary waiver is well-intentioned, will it serve as little more than a palliative remedy, which sets in motion a larger disruption to the global energy supply chain? Considering staunch opposition from industry leaders, prior denial of waivers based on oil prices, and the stringent requirements for private industry to obtain a waiver, the efficaciousness of the Trump Administration’s March 18th waiver is ripe for debate. Will the decision to suspend the Jones Act set up a recurring model to deter the consistent application of domestic cabotage regulations each time that a unilateral action of an executive administration creates or contributes to the underlying condition responsible for the need to flash-pause the subject legislation? Will continued suspensions erode the Jones Act of its potency? Will this and similar actions enhance anti-Jones Act rhetoric to the detriment of those the Act seeks to protect, or lead to the ultimate repeal of the Act? And what international trade impacts are likely to follow yet another waiver of administrative convenience? Will the glut of oil traffic by foreign flag ships create a trade imbalance? Will the mere increase in the numbers of foreign flag crude carriers traveling between U.S. ports, especially during a global military conflict, serve to enhance or detract from national security initiatives? And will the free flow of bulk products into, around, and out of the Unites States and other free trade nations set up a bullwhip effect on global energy markets, sending commodity pricing into an unpredictable action-reaction cycle? In the midst of the current tariff debate, how will increasing volumes of crude oil, natural gas, fertilizer, and coal entering global markets be assessed at entry?

For answers to these questions, and more, please contact your international trade and shipping professionals at Kean Miller.

Taylor Ashworth, Cristina Goulet, Stephen Hanemann, and Tim Strickland are members of Kean Miller’s Offshore Energy & Marine group, representing a wide range of clients in complex maritime, energy, and international trade matters. Their work spans litigation, transactions, and regulatory issues involving offshore oil and gas exploration, drilling and decommissioning, marine operations, and related logistics and insurance challenges.

[1] 46 USC § 50101 et seq.

[2] See Kōloa Rum Co. v. Noem, No. CV 25-554 (JEB), 2026 WL 145882 (D.D.C. Jan. 20, 2026).

[3] Cabotage is defined as “the transport of goods or passengers from one port or place to another in the same country.” Cabotage, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

[4] Id. at *2.

[5] See American Maritime Partnership, Statement on Issuance of Jones Act Waiver (May 13, 2021).

[6] The 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”) significantly limited the Waiver Provision by NDAA requiring that automatic waivers requested by the Secretary of defense be “in the interest of the national defense to address an immediate adverse effect on military operations.” The 2023 NDAA again amended the Waiver Provision, by mandating that only the “President” can determine that a waiver is necessary in the interest of national defense for “discretionary” waivers.

[7] See 46 U.S.C. § 501.

[8] John Frittelli, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45725, Shipping Under the Jones Act: Legislative and Regulatory Background 2 (Nov. 21, 2019) (Frittelli) (citing U.S. Customs Service, HQ 111930, October 8, 1991).

[9] Matthew Gawley, Unchartered Waters: Analyzing the Impact of Post-Hurricane Jones Act Waivers (2005 to 2022), 50 Tul. Mar. L.J. 95 (2026) (“Beginning in 2005, the executive branch has waived the Jones Act four times to expedite post-hurricane disaster relief.”)

[10] Constantine G. Papavizas & Brooke F. Shapiro, Jones Act Administrative Waivers, 42 Tul. Mar. L.J. 317, 352 (2018).