In an article discussing Genesis Energy, L.P. v. Danos, L.L.C., we recently explored how the U.S. Fifth Circuit has refined the analysis for determining whether a contract qualifies as “maritime” over time.

In a February 9, 2026, decision, the Fifth Circuit continued to build on the framework of this fact-specific inquiry and affirmed the denial of a summary judgment filed by Aries Marine Corporation, holding that a Master Services Contract (MSC) between Fieldwood Energy and United Fire & Safety for fire-watch services was nonmaritime, thereby triggering Louisiana law under OCSLA and invalidating cross-indemnity provisions. In re Aries Marine Corp., 166 F.4th 521 (5th Cir. 2026).

Background

The case arose after the L/B RAM XVIII liftboat listed and capsized off the Louisiana coast during a platform repair project by the Platform owner/operator, Fieldwood Energy.

The case centered around the review of the contract between Fieldwood Energy as owner/operator of an offshore platform and United Fire and Safety as fire watch vendor. As part of its platform repair project, Fieldwood hired United Fire to perform safety and fire monitoring/watch services as it performed work on the platform. United Fire chartered a liftboat from Aries Marine to help it perform these services, but during operations the liftboat’s port leg punched through and penetrated the seabed and listed and capsized. Aries Marine filed a limitation action, and a United Fire employee then filed a personal injury action within the context of the limitation action.

Aries sought defense and indemnity from United Fire based on the cross-indemnity provisions within the Fieldwood and United Fire contract, and the question was whether the contract between Fieldwood and United Fire was maritime or not. If the contract was maritime, then Aries Marine could seek defense and indemnity from United Fire pursuant to the contractual indemnity provisions in the contract. If not maritime, then the Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act (LOAIA) would apply to bar indemnity.

The district court held the contract was nonmaritime and applied LOAIA to bar indemnity; and the Fifth Circuit agreed and affirmed.

Applying Doiron’s Two-Prong Analysis

Under Doiron,[1] a maritime contract exists if:

1. the contract is one to provide services to facilitate the drilling or production of oil and gas on navigable waters and
2. the contract provides or the parties to the contract expect that a vessel will play a substantial role in the completion of the project.

The Fifth Circuit first determined that the contract did not outline the substantial use of a vessel in the work to be performed.

Next, the court looked at whether the parties expected a vessel to play a substantial role, and here the court reviewed its recent decision in Genesis v. Danos, which was discussed in our last update here. Aries argued that Fieldwood anticipated using the liftboat for transportation, crane work, and lodging. Aries also provided evidence that Aries and Fieldwood had discussed particulars of the vessel placement on the situs. However, the court noted that United Fire (one of the parties to the contract) was not a part of these discussions, and thus the evidence presented did not show that United Fire anticipated the use of a vessel in the performance of the work involved. The Fifth Circuit found that Fieldwood anticipated the use of the vessel, but United Fire did not, and the court held that “the vessel’s substantial role must be a shared expectation.”

Time Spent on the Vessel

Aries also argued two additional points: that the Plaintiff spent considerable time aboard the liftboat, and the liftboat provided important and essential construction and crane support. The Fifth Circuit held that the time spent on the vessel was not relevant to the analysis, because, as explained in Genesis v. Danos, time spent on the vessel for housing, down time, eating, etc. is not part of the “substantial vessel use” analysis. Also, the Fifth Circuit found more persuasive the evidence showing that Plaintiff had no idea where his work assignment was going to take place, what his job would entail, or where he would stay overnight.

Vessel Use Contemplated by Third Parties Is Not Relevant to the Maritime Contract Analysis

The Fifth Circuit also reasoned that the vessel’s instrumental crane support services were “irrelevant” to United Fire’s contracted fire watch services. Because United Fire is the contracting party, it is the nature of United Fire’s work that matters, not the work or services provided by other parties on the vessel.

Substantial Use of a Vessel Must be Contemplated and not Merely Possible

Finally, Aries argued that fire watch services are customary in the maritime industry and United Fire should have expected the use of a vessel. The Fifth Circuit noted, however, that the contract must still anticipate the substantial use of a vessel, and the fact that fire watch services could be maritime is not enough to show that the substantial use of a vessel actually was contemplated in this case.

Important takeaways:

1. The fact that the vessel could have played a substantial role is not enough, the parties must have actually contemplated this outcome.
2. Look to the intent of the contracting parties themselves, it does not matter if other parties contemplated the substantial use of this vessel in their work, only the contracting parties are relevant.
3. The parties’ contemplation of the substantial use of a vessel must be a “shared expectation.” If one party contemplates the use of a vessel and the other does not, then it is a non-maritime contract.

Ambrose Stearns is an associate in Kean Miller’s Offshore Energy & Marine group, based in the firm’s Lafayette office. He partners with a wide range of clients, particularly Louisiana-based and multistate energy companies, to deliver practical, business-focused counsel at every stage of growth. Ambrose’s experience spans corporate and transactional matters, regulatory compliance, and entity formation, as well as the drafting and negotiation of employment agreements, commercial contracts, and strategic partnering and service arrangements.

[1] In Re Larry Doiron, Inc., 879 F.3d 568, 576 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc).